Brazil invokes reciprocity with 15.8% of its trade exposed to the US — and 30.6% to China

What was triggered

On 13 August the Brazilian government notified the United States that it had opened proceedings under Law 15,122/2025, the Economic Reciprocity Law, concerning the unilateral measures adopted under Section 301 of the American trade act. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested diplomatic consultations.

The law, approved unanimously by Congress and signed in 2025, allows the suspension of trade concessions, of investment commitments and of obligations related to intellectual property.

Brazil is under two American tariffs that stack: 25% specific to the country and 12.5% of broader scope, with exceptions by product.

The timeline is the most relevant fact, and the least reported

Marcio Elias Rosa, the minister of Development, Industry and Trade, said on 14 August that there is a first assessment phase of 60 days and that the full process may take around nine months, running into 2027. In practice, the deliberation falls to the next government. The law sets no peremptory deadlines, and the government may adopt an emergency measure at any time — a door left explicitly open.

That repositions the event: this is not the beginning of a trade war. It is the opening of a pressure channel at close to zero immediate cost, with the option to escalate preserved.

The official reading confirms it. Celso Amorim, special adviser to the presidency for international affairs, said the measure does not seek to punish the United States, but to remove what he classifies as an unwarranted punishment. The finance minister, Dario Durigan, said the assessment will proceed with caution and responsibility, and that the measure may or may not be adopted. Analysts interviewed by Folha on 14 August described the action as a pressure tool that requires fine tuning so as not to worsen the economy.

The government also signaled that reciprocity may be invoked outside the tariff field — intellectual property was cited — seeking to press sectors of American interest without deepening the damage to the Brazilian economy.

Brazil's exposure, measured

The United States account for 15.75% of Brazil's total trade (US$ 84.1 billion), its second partner. China accounts for 30.64% (US$ 163.6 billion), nearly double.

Total trade adds up what comes in and what goes out. In the Brazil–US case in 2024: US$ 43.2 billion of imports and US$ 40.9 billion of exports.

Brazilian trade is concentrated in agriculture (23.98%), energy (17.56%) and manufacturing (17.20%) out of a US$ 533.9 billion total.

Who is in the same shock

Exposure to the United States as a share of total trade. Basis: consolidated 2024, the 19 Latin American countries with bilateral data in the series.

Brazil is the 14th most exposed to the United States among the 19. Mexico's exposure is 4.4 times larger. The concentration sits in Central America and the Caribbean: five countries are above 45%, a band no South American country comes close to.

Brazil, Chile and Peru form a bloc with the pattern inverted: China is the number one partner and the United States the number two, weighing far less. In Brazil the difference is nearly double.

There is an adjustment that total trade hides. The American tariff falls on what Brazil sells, not on the flow in both directions. Measured by exports alone, Brazilian exposure to the United States rises to 17.73% (US$ 40.9 billion) — and Peru, which sits above Brazil on total trade at 17.27%, drops to 14.94%. The two swap places depending on the metric. The order of magnitude does not change; the ranking does.

That sustains the argument of those who defend the measure — the direct cost of an escalation is limited. And it exposes the flank: Brazil's real dependence is Chinese.

The accusation that changes the board

On the same 13 August, the American government placed Brazil on a list of more than 40 countries accused of facilitating Chinese tariff evasion through transshipment. Brazil was classified at "tier 2 — significant economic integration", alongside Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam. Trade adviser Peter Navarro presented the report, noting that the problems identified concern mainly other nations.

Reciprocity and the transshipment accusation are not separate stories. They are the same board: Brazil retaliates against the United States at the exact moment it is accused of serving as a route for China — the partner that accounts for 30.6% of its trade.

The return channel

If the American tariff displaces Brazilian cargo, that cargo looks for another buyer. This is where the neighbors come in, and not through joint retaliation.

Chile (36.56%) and Peru (35.84%) already have China as their number one partner, weighing more than it does for Brazil, and they compete for the same Asian markets. Recorded on 12 August: the port of Chancay connects Paita to Costa Rica and consolidates a direct route from Peruvian agriculture to Asia; Peruvian blueberries are gaining ground in China.

Agriculture is 23.98% of Brazilian trade, the largest sector, and the one most dependent on the Asian buyer.

The second-order risk for Brazil is not that the neighbor retaliates alongside it. It is that the neighbor occupies the market Brazil will try to win back while it negotiates with Washington.

The market has already moved

Over the period: the Ibovespa fell for nine consecutive sessions, losing more than 3% in the week — an eighth straight fall has occurred only seven times since 2000. The dollar above R$ 5.20 on 14 August, opening lower at R$ 5.1793 the following day. Foreign outflows of R$ 5.5 billion from the B3 in the first week of August alone, with the stress migrating to the yield curve.

Reciprocity did not cause that movement — it began before. But it happens inside it, and that limits the room for maneuver that Folha itself points to as necessary.