Argentine poverty stopped falling: 32.3% in the first half, and the engine that drove it down from 52.9% lost strength
Argentina’s statistics institute recorded poverty of 32.3% in its cities in the first half of 2026, up from 28.2% in the previous half — the first rise in two years. Annual inflation remains near 33%, the economy contracted in the second quarter, and unemployment reached 7.9%, the highest since 2021.
Occurred September 24, 2026
Thesis
Argentine poverty has not exploded again, but it has stopped falling. What drove it down from 52.9% to 28.2% in two years was disinflation, and that engine has lost strength: annual inflation is stuck near 33%, consumption baskets are rising faster than income, activity contracted in the second quarter, and unemployment is the highest since 2021. The next reading, in March 2027, will say whether 28.2% was a floor.
What is at stake
In Argentina, poverty is measured by income: a family is poor if its income does not buy a basket of basic goods and services. That is why the index responds very quickly to inflation. When prices rise faster than wages, poverty rises; when inflation falls, it falls too. That is what happened between 2024 and 2025: inflation plunged and poverty went from 52.9% to 28.2%, the lowest level since 2018. In the first half of 2026, poverty returned to 32.3%, with 9.7 million people in the surveyed cities. The explanation pointed to by economists is that consumption baskets have been rising faster than average inflation since the end of 2025, while formal employment weakened. At the same time, the economy contracted 0.6% in the second quarter from the first, and unemployment reached 7.9%. The government denies there is a recession and calls the poverty figure an old photograph.
Who is affected
Households in interior cities
under pressure · quarters
The rise was larger in the smaller urban areas, where average income is lower and formal employment is scarcer.
Concordia, in Entre Ríos, with 56.2% poverty; Gran Resistencia, in Chaco, with 48.6%. In urban areas with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, poverty rose 4.9 points.
Workers
under pressure · quarters
Loss of formal employment and rising informality, which reduces income and protection.
Unemployment of 7.9% in the second quarter, the highest since 2021, with informal employment rising one point in a year.
Milei government
under pressure · quarters
The decline in poverty was the main social result of the economic program, one year before the presidential election of October 2027.
Approval of 38% in August, according to a poll cited by the press coverage.
Creditors and holders of Argentine bonds
uncertain · immediate
Weaker activity and electoral risk raise the premium demanded to finance the country.
The country risk premium went from 402 points in July to more than 640 on September 28, and was at 611 on October 14. Dollar bonds yielding about 10%.
Possible impacts on people
- Prices
- This is the channel that decides the index. Monthly inflation is back below 2%, but annual inflation remains near 33%, and the baskets that define the poverty line rose faster than the average.Inflation of 1.9% in September and 33.4% over twelve months.
- Employment
- Fewer registered employers and more informality reduce income for households at the bottom of the distribution.Unemployment of 7.9% and a drop of 32,290 registered employers since November 2023, according to a survey based on official data.
- Credit
- Argentine banks now earn more from government bonds than from loans, which reduces the credit available to companies and households.Revenue from government bonds equal to about 56% of banks’ operating revenue in July, according to the central bank cited by the press coverage.
Repercussions across the region
Brazil
Brazil is Argentina’s largest trading partner. Weaker Argentine demand reduces purchases of Brazilian goods, especially manufactured goods and vehicles.
Brazil accounts for 22.34% of Argentine trade, about 27.96 billion dollars in 2024. We have not measured recent changes in that flow.
What to watch
- Third-quarter output, released in December. Argentina’s central bank projects a 1% decline from the previous quarter, which would amount to a technical recession.
- Monthly inflation for October and November, which the market projects at 1.7% and 1.6%.
- The poverty figure for the second half of 2026, which the statistics institute usually releases in March.
- Third-quarter unemployment and the trend in formal employment.
- The country risk premium and the Treasury’s ability to roll over its debt, with about 25 billion dollars in hard-currency maturities in 2027.
- The government’s appeal against the court ruling that ordered the university funding law to be applied.
Share of the population of the surveyed urban areas below the poverty line. Halves available in the press coverage; the second half of 2024 is not among them.
The figure
On September 24, Argentina’s statistics institute reported that 32.3% of the population of the 31 urban areas it surveys was below the poverty line in the first half of 2026. In the previous half, it was 28.2%.
That is 9.7 million people in the surveyed cities. Extreme poverty (indigence) — income that does not cover even the food basket — rose from 6.3% to 7.5%, or 2.2 million people.
It was the first rise in two years.
How it is measured, and why it matters
In Argentina, poverty is measured by income. A household is poor when what it earns does not buy a basket of basic goods and services, calculated month by month. In June, a family of four needed about 1.53 million pesos to stay above the line.
This method makes the index react very quickly to prices. If inflation rises faster than wages, poverty rises in the following half. If inflation falls, poverty falls with it.
That is why the Argentine series is so volatile — and why the September figure says more about inflation than it seems.
From 52.9% to 28.2%, and back to 32.3%
In the first half of 2024, at the height of the price crisis that marked the start of Javier Milei’s government, poverty reached 52.9%. From there, inflation plunged, and poverty fell with it to 28.2% in the second half of 2025, the lowest level since 2018.
That decline was the main social result of the government’s economic program.
The new figure shows that the decline has stopped. But the comparison must be read carefully. Against the previous half, the rise is 4.1 points. Against the same half of 2025, when poverty stood at 31.6%, the rise is only 0.7 point — a difference that, according to one of the sources, the institute itself considers statistically insignificant.
The honest reading, therefore, is not that poverty exploded again. It is that it stopped falling.
The engine that lost strength
If disinflation brought poverty down, the explanation for why it stopped lies in inflation.
Monthly inflation is back below 2% — it was 1.9% in September. But annual inflation remains at 33.4%, practically at the same level for months. And, according to economists interviewed by the press coverage, the baskets that define the poverty line have been rising faster than average inflation since the end of 2025. For those near the line, the cost of living has risen faster than income.
The labor market did not compensate. Unemployment reached 7.9% in the second quarter, the highest since 2021, and informal employment grew by one point in a year. A survey based on official records counts 32,290 fewer employers since November 2023 — with the caveat that one fewer registered employer is not the same as a closed company.
And activity contracted. Output in the second quarter fell 0.6% from the first, the first quarterly decline in two years, and the July monthly indicator dropped 2.9%. Argentina’s central bank projects another decline in the third quarter, which would amount to a technical recession. The International Monetary Fund cut its growth forecast for Argentina in 2026 from 3.5% to 2.1%.
Where it weighs most
The rise was not uniform. In urban areas with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants, poverty rose 4.9 points; in the larger ones, 3.9. Concordia, in Entre Ríos, has 56.2% poverty. Gran Resistencia, in Chaco, 48.6%. In the city of Buenos Aires, according to one of the sources, the rate is 11.1% — and in its metropolitan surroundings, 36.9%.
The government’s response
President Milei denies there is a recession. In an interview at the end of September, he called the poverty figure an old photograph and said the indicators show anything. The economy minister, Luis Caputo, ruled out a recession on October 16 and predicted a strong recovery in the fourth quarter.
The market reads it differently. The country risk premium, which stood at 402 points in July, passed 640 at the end of September and was at 611 on October 14. The presidential election is in October 2027, and Milei has already said he will seek reelection.
Reading
Argentine poverty is today more or less where it was a year ago. What has changed is the direction: the mechanism that brought it down — prices rising less than income — has stopped operating, and the two factors that could replace it, growth and employment, are moving backward.
The question the figure leaves is whether 28.2% was a floor. The official answer comes in March 2027, with the second-half figure. Until then, what indicates the direction is monthly inflation, third-quarter output, and unemployment.
Analytical rigor
Below we state what could bring this reading down, and how far it reaches.
What would disprove this analysis
- If poverty in the second half of 2026, released in March 2027, comes in below 28.2%, the reading that the decline has run its course will be wrong.
- If third-quarter output grows from the second and unemployment falls below 7.5%, the reading that activity has lost strength will be wrong.
- If annual inflation falls below 25% by December 2026, the disinflation engine will have started working again, contrary to what we describe.
- If the institute’s report shows that the rise in poverty came mainly from a change in method or from seasonality, and not from income against prices, our explanation will be wrong.
The limits of this analysis
- We did not read the report of Argentina’s statistics institute. The numbers come from press coverage that cites the agency.
- The 44.5% figure for children aged 0 to 14 appears in different sources either as the poverty rate for that group or as the share of the poor who are children. These are incompatible readings, and that is why we do not use it.
- The rise over the same half of 2025 is 0.7 point, from 31.6% to 32.3%. One source states that the institute considers it statistically insignificant. The 4.1-point rise is over the immediately preceding half, and we do not know how much of it is seasonal.
- The explanation that baskets rose faster than income comes from economists cited by the press coverage, and one of the figures supporting it was not checked against a primary source.
- The figure of 32,290 fewer employers comes from a research center that uses official records. One of the sources warns that one fewer registered employer does not mean a closed company: there are mergers and registry changes.
- The regional breakdowns do not match across sources: one speaks of the Buenos Aires conurbano, another of the metropolitan region, another of the city. Without the official table, we do not compare them.
- Our indicators on Argentina are from 2024, the peak year of the price crisis, and do not describe current conditions. We do not have a poverty rate in the database.
Level of confidence
72%
The central figure is official, from Argentina’s statistics institute, and was reported by eight independent origins in five countries, with detail by age, region, and income. The surrounding conditions — output, unemployment, and inflation — also come from dated official releases. What holds the grade down: we did not read the institute’s report, and two sources disagree on what the 44.5% figure for children means; the comparison with a year earlier shows a small rise that, according to one source, the institute itself considers statistically insignificant; and the link between disinflation and poverty is our reading of the data, not a conclusion of the institute.
Trade and exposure
Participações calculadas sobre os dados de comércio bilateral consolidados.
Trade exposure — Argentina
| Counterparts | % | US$ |
|---|---|---|
| Brazil | 22.34% | US$ 28.0bn |
| China | 14.09% | US$ 17.6bn |
| United States | 10.15% | US$ 12.7bn |
| Chile | 5.65% | US$ 7.1bn |
| India | 4.18% | US$ 5.2bn |
| Paraguay | 3.80% | US$ 4.8bn |
| VNM | 3.24% | US$ 4.1bn |
| Germany | 2.12% | US$ 2.7bn |
Trade composition
| Sectors | % | US$ |
|---|---|---|
| Agriculture and food | 30.92% | US$ 38.7bn |
| Manufacturing and automotive | 22.04% | US$ 27.6bn |
| Energy | 9.05% | US$ 11.3bn |
| Chemicals and petrochemicals | 8.70% | US$ 10.9bn |
| Electronics | 6.35% | US$ 8.0bn |
| Mining and metals | 2.70% | US$ 3.4bn |